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BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
MINIMUM CONTACTS ANALYSIS EXTENDED TO ASSERTIONS OF
•	 IN REM JURISDICTION: Shaffer v. Heitner
Plaintiff, a shareholder' in the Greyhound Corporation, a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Phoenix, Arizona,
brought a stockholder's derivative suits in the Delaware Chancery Court on
behalf of Greyhound and its wholly-owned subsidiary' against. twenty-eight
present and former corporate officers and directors. In his complaint, the
plaintiff alleged that the misconduct of the individual defendants had
caused Greyhound and its subsidiary to be held liable in a private antitrust
suit'' and also for violation of a United States district court order' both of
which resulted in substantial losses to the cOrporations. 5
Neither the plaintiff nor the individual defendants were Delaware res-
idents.' In order to subject the defendants to Delaware jurisdiction, the
plaintiff invoked the procedure available under the Delaware sequestration
statute. 8 This procedure provides for seizure of Delaware property interests
' Plaintiff was the holder of one share of stock in the Greyhound Corporation. 433 U.S.
186, 189 (1977).
Id. at 186.
3 The subsidiary, Greyhound Lines, Inc., is a California corporation with its principal
place of business in Phoenix, Arizona. Id. at 189 n.l.
4 See Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 716 (1978). A competitor brought suit against the Greyhound Corporation
alleging that Greyhound violated the Sherman Act by engaging in forms of predatory conduct
after the Interstate Commerce Commission had granted the competitor certain routes. Id. at
690. There was evidence that Greyhound had fraudulently concealed the existence of the an-
titrust cause of action sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. Id. at 698. A jury verdict
awarded treble damages to the competitor in the amount of $13,146,090. Id. at 688 n.1.
United States v, Greyhound Corp., 370 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. III. 1974), 4/(1, 508 F.2d
529 (7th Cir. 1974). The court held Greyhound in criminal contempt for knowingly violating
the court's order that Greyhound voluntarily and accurately quote joint through routes involv-
ing the competitor and refrain from quoting the competitor's service unfavorably or inaccu-
rately. The court also held the corporate officers of both the parent corporation and its sub-
sidiary in civil contempt. for failing to curb the violations. See 370 F. Supp. at 883.
" The losses consisted of the $13,146,090 plus attorney fees suffered in the antitrust suit
and tines of $100,000 and $500,000 against the parent and its subsidiary respectively. See
United States v. Greyhound Corp.,•370 F. Supp. 881, 883 (N.D. III. 1974).
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 189, 191.
8 DEL COM ANN. tit. 10, * 366 (1974) provides in relevant part:
(a) If	 the defendant or any one or more of' the defendants is a nonresident
of the State, the Court may make an order directing such nonresident defen-
dant or defendants to appear.... Such order shall be served on such nonres-
ident defendant... by mail or otherwise, if practicable, and shall he published
in such a manner as the Court directs.... The Court may compel the ap-
pearance of the defendant by the seizure of all or any part of his property,
which property may be sold under the order of the Court to pay the demand
of the plaintiff, if the defendant does not appear, or otherwise defaults:Any
defendant whose property shall have been so seized and who shall have en-
tered a general appearance in the cause may, upon notice to the plaintiff, pe-
tition the Court for any order releasing such property or any part thereof
from the seizure. The Court shall release such property unless the plaintiff'
shall satisfy the Court that because of other circumstances there is a reason-
able possibility that such release may render it substantially less likely that
plaintiff will obtain satisfaction of any judgment secured. If such petition
shall not be granted, or if no such petition shall be tiled, such property shall
remain subject to seizure and may be sold to satisfy any judgment entered in
the cause. The Court may at any time release such property or any part
thereof upon the giving of sufficient security.
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to compel a nonresident defendant to submit to the personal jurisdiction
of Delaware courts for adjudication of claims against him. if the defendant
does appear in answer to the sequestration order, he must make a general
appearance and submit to the personal jurisdiction of the court." If' he does
not appear, the property which has been seized may be sold in satisfaction
of an eventual default judgment."' Should the defendant choose to make a
general appearance, he may petition the court for a release of his property,
which release will normally be granted absent a showing of a special reason
by the plaintiff for continuation of the sequestration order."
Crucial to the operation of' the sequestration statute in a derivative
suit is the Delaware rule that stock in a corporation incorporated under Del-
aware law retains its situs in Delaware regardless of its physical location."
Employing this traditional sitos rule under the sequestration procedure, the
plaintiff applied for and obtained from the Delaware Court, of Chancery a
sequestration order to seize approximately 82,000 shares of Greyhound
common stock belonging to nineteen of the defendants as well as options
held by two other defendants.' 3 These seizures were effectuated through
the placement of stop transfer 'or similar orders on the books of the
Greyhound Corporation.' 4
The individual defendants were notified of the commencement of the
suit. by certified mail and through publication.' 3 In response, the defen-
dants filed a notice and motion to quash service of process and to vacate
the order of sequestration."' They argued that their right to clue process
under the fourteenth amendment was violated by the ex parte sequestra-
tion procedure and that they did not have sufficient contacts with Delaware
to support that state's assertion of in personam jurisdiction through the
sequestration process." The court of chancery denied defendants' motions
(h) The Court. may	 require the plaintiff to give approved security to abide
any order of the Court respecting the property.
(c) Any transfer or assignment of the property so seized after the seizure thereof
shall he void and after the sale of the properly is made and confirmed, the
purchaser shall be entitled to and have all the right, title and interest of the
defendant in and to the property so seized and sold and such sale and con-
firmation shall transfer to the purchaser all the right, title, and interest of the
defendant in and to the property ....
" ld. § 366(a).
1 " ht. As the procedure has been interpreted and applied by the state and federal courts
in Delaware, neither notice nor a hearing need be given prior to the actual seizure of prop-
erty. See United States Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 348 F. Supp. 1004, 1021-22 (D. Del. 1972) ?we'd
on other grounds, 540 F.2d 142, 155-157 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977); Gor-
don v. Michel, 297 A.2d 420, 423 (Del. Ch. 1972).
" DEL. Conti ANN. tit. 10, § 366(a) (1974).
13 Da. Cone ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (1974).
" Shoff r, 433 U.S. at 191-92. The remaining defendants owned no property affected
by the sequestration order. Id. at 192 n.8. The value of the stock on May 23, 1974, the day the
sequestration order was signed, was estimated at approximately $1.2 million. Id. at 192 n.7.
Other property seqbestered included debentures, warrants and stock unit credits. Id. at 192
n.8.
" 433 U.S. at 192.
15 Id. at 192.
16 Id. at 192-93.
"Id. at 193. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington. 326 U.S. 310 (1945); see text at
notes 42-57, 82-95, 103-18 infra.
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and upheld the validity of the sequestration 'statute. The Delaware Su-
preme Court affirmed."
In an opinion by justice Marshall," the Supreme Court reversed the
state supreme court2 ° and HELD: A state which seeks to assert jurisdiction
over a person outside its borders must demonstrate minimum contacts
among the parties, the disputed transaction, and the forum state." The
Court based its reasoning on its recognition of the often-stated premise that.
judicial jurisdiction over a thing actually refers to jurisdiction over the
interests of persons in a thing. 22
 Accordingly, it concluded that state juris-
diction formerly allowed on the mere presence of a person's property
within the forum, such as provided in the Delaware sequestration statute,
can henceforth be justified only where that jurisdiction would satisfy the
standard for jurisdiction over the interests of persons. 23 Whether in fact
the exercise of jurisdiction over the interests of persons satisfies the due
process clause must be determined under the minimum contacts standard
for personal jurisdiction enunciated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington."
The Court further held, therefore, that Delaware's sequestration statute
was constitutionally invalid since its purpose was to secure personal jurisdic-
tion over a defendant solely on the basis of the statutory presence of the
defendant's property in Delaware, without a showing of how such property
provided sufficient contacts among the defendant, the forum state and the
litigation. 23
 Finally, on the facts of Shaffer, the Court held that Delaware's
asserted jurisdiction failed not only because the sequestered property was
neither the subject matter of the litigation nor of any relationship to the
underlying cause of .action, but also because other contacts sufficient to
support jurisdiction were lacking. 2°
The significance of Shaffer lies in its fundamental alteration of the
bases for the assertion and determination of state court jurisdiction. The
Court specifically rejected the territorial rationale of Pennoyer v. Neff"  as
the underlying basis for in rem jurisdiction; henceforth all assertions of
state court jurisdiction in rem, as well as in personam, must satisfy the Inter-
national Shoe standard of fairness and substantial justice. 28
' 8
 Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 237 (Del. 1976).
13
 justice Marshall was joined in the opinion by Chief Justice Burger and justices
Stewart, White, Blackmun and Powell. Justice Brennan concurred in Parts 1-111 of the opinion
and dissented as to Part 1V. justices Powell and Stevens filed concurring opinions. Justice
Rehnquist did not participate in the consideration or the decision of the case.
2" 433 U.S. at 195.
21 Id. at 207, 212-13.
33
 RESTATENiENT (SECOND) or CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56, Introductory Note (1971). See
Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71, 76, 55 N.E. 812, 814 (Holmes, C.j.), appeal dis-
missed, 179 U.S. 405, 410 (1900).
33
 433 U.S. at 207.
" 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
55
 433 U.S. at 208-09.
" Id. at 213-17.
" 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
" A judgment in personam imposes a personal liability or obligation upon one person
in favor of another. A judgment in rem affects the interest of all persons in designated prop-
erty. A judgment quasi-in-rem affects the interests of particular persons in designated prop-
erty. Quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is of two types: (l) Where the plaintiff seeks to secure a pre-
existing claim in the subject property and to extinguish or establish the nonexistence of similar
interests of particular persons; (2) Where the plaintiff seeks to apply what he concedes to be
the property of the defendant to the satisfaction of a claim against him. See RESTATEMENT OF
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This note will briefly trace the historical development of the concep-
tual structure of state jurisdiction to the point. to which it had evolved be-
fore its examination by the Court in Shaffer. Attention will focus primarily
upon the contrast presented by the development of substantive due process
standards alongside the continued existence of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction.
Next, the Court's reasoning in Shaffer will be set forth in sufficient detail to
provide the basis for a subsequent assessment. of the Court's application of
minimum contacts analysis to the facts before it. Finally, the note will
examine the impact the Shaffer should have upon the validity of the so-
called "Seiler attachment procedure" 26—a quasi-in-rem device employed by
certain state courts for the assertion of jurisdiction in personal injury cases
involving nonresident. defendants whose insurers do business in the forum
state.
It will be submitted that upon the factual record before it and in view
of the subject matter of the controversy, the Shaffer Court's minimum con-
tacts analysis was unnecessarily restrictive. Furthermore, it will be suggested
that the Court's minimum contacts approach under the standard of fairness
in Shaffer, does not support the continued application of the Seidel- attach-
ment procedure as a judicial device for the assertion of jurisdiction.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR STATE COURT
JURISDICTION
A. Early Doctrine
Perhaps no other decision has had such a lingering influence upon
the development of jurisdictional principles as the century old decision in
Pennoyer v. AV/1n The theory of jurisdiction enunciated by Justice Field in
that case asserted the sanctity of each state's geographic borders and the
physical power which each exercised over persons and property within its
borders.'" Implicit in the formulation was the assumption that state judicial
power can be asserted separately over persons and over property. 32
itiocimENTs, 5-9 (1942). The Court in Shaffer, as it had done in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 246 n. 12 (1958), chose to use the term in rem to include boils in rem arid quasi-in-rem.
433 U.S. at 199 n.17. This convention will he followed in this note where appropriate. How-
ever, an effort generally will be made to indicate the specific type of in rein jurisdiction at
issue.
29 Sec Seidel. v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). See re-
lated discussion at notes 66-76, and 151-76 infra.
5"95 U.S. 714 (1877). Pennoyer was the defendant in an ejectment action brought in
federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. He had purchased the Irind in question in
a sheriff's sale held to satisfy the judgment in a previous action in an Oregon state court by
one Mitchell against Neff for attorney fees. Neff was a nonresident of Oregon at the dine of
Mitchell's suit, However, Mitchell had obtained jurisdiction over Neff by means of an Oregon
statute which provided service by publications on nonresidents with property in Oregon. 'The
federal district court rejected the validity of Mitchell's judgment against NefT and awarded the
property to Neff. The Supreme Court affirmed on the grounds that Neff did not receive per-
sonal service of process and, that even if he had, it would have been invalid since Neff was
outside the state's territorial limits. Id, at 733-36.
31 Id. at 722.
a' The arguably logical contradiction which that assumption entails, namely, that ad-
judicatory authority can be exercised over things without at the same time exercising it in ef-
fect over' persons, was a crucial point of departure for the Court in its reasoning in Shaffer.
See text at note 22 supra.
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This dichotomous view of persons and property created the possibility
that even though a state could not exercise its jurisdiction over a person
because he was located outside its territory it nevertheless might. exercise
jurisdiction over that person's• property if such property were located
within its borders and might use the property to satisfy a plaintiff's claim. 33
The exercise of this adjudicatory authority was quasi-in-rem when the
plaintiff sought to determine the interests of particular persons in the
property," the use or possession of which had in some manner given rise
to the interests asserted.
A second type of quasi-in-rem action gradually developed in which
the plaintiff initiated a personal claim wholly unrelated to the nonresident
defendant's property within the forum. The purpose of the seizure of the
property in such a case was to satisfy the unrelated claim from the res con-
sidered to be under the state's exclusive power.35 Where the res was neither
tangible nor present within the forum, however, this quasi-in-rem device
proved more awkward. In the well-known case of Harris v. Balk, 3° the Su-
preme Court held that a debt owed by one party to another was an intan-
gible which could be attached by a third party if the debtor should chance
to enter the third party's forum. This result was criticized as unfair since a
creditor cannot control the movements of his debtor, and the rule there-
fore would make it possible for the creditor to be subjected to the jurisdic-
tion of a state that had no relationship to the cause of action or to either of
the parties.37
 Nevertheless, as long as the territorial view of jurisdiction
persisted the result under the quasi-in-rem device of Harris was at least jus-
tifiable.
It soon became evident, however, that the concept of territoriality was
too confining to serve states' legitimate policy concerns in matters increas-
ingly affected by interstate transactions." Thus, for example, with the ad-
vent of the automobile and the occurrence of accidents involving nonresi-
33
 95 U.S. at 733.
" Quasi-in-rem actions typically included proceedings to foreclose a mortgage, to re-
move a cloud from title or to effect partition. Such actions were distinguishable from pure in
rem actions in which the proceeding was directly against the property without reference to the
title or interest of particular individuals. Pure in rem actions were not very common. One ex-
ample was an action in admiralty directly against a vessel held responsible for causing injuries
to persons. The in rein judgment affected the interests of all persons in the vessel. See RE-
STATEMENT Or J UDGMENTS. 6-7 (1942). See also note '18 supra.
"See Smit, The Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43
BROOKLYN L. Rev. 600, 615-616 (1977).
36
 198 U.S. 215 (1905). Harris, a North Carolina resident, owed Balk, a fellow resident,
$180. Balk in turn was the debtor of a third party, Epstein, who lived in Maryland. While
Harris was visiting Maryland, Epstein served him with a writ of attachment garnishing his debt
to Balk. A default judgment was subsequently entered against Balk, and Harris, in accordance
with the judgment, paid Epstein. Balk then sued Harris in North Carolina for the $180 but
Harris argued in defense that he had made payment to Epstein under the garnishment in
Maryland. The North Carolina court held the Maryland judgment invalid on the basis that the
situs of the debt Harris owed Balk remained in North Carolina where Harris lived. The Su-
preme Court reversed. Id. at 228.
37 See Beak, The Exercise of Jurisdiction In Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt, 27 HARV, L.
REV. 107 (1913). For a favorable view of the attachment procedure, see Carpenter, jurisdiction
Over Debts for the Purpose of Administration, Garnishment, and Taxation, 31 HAM. L. Rev. 905,
910.918 (1918).
"See Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of Fair-
ness, 69 Mimi-. Rev. 300, 305 (1970).
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dent motorists and local residents, the state arguably had a claim under its
police power to protect the general welfare of its people. This substantive
policy concern dictated that a means be devised to maneuver outside the
rigid contours of conventional jurisdictional theory. In the leading case of
Hess v. Pawloski" 9 this was achieved by the admitted fiction of' attributing
consent to personal jurisdiction on the part of the nonresident motorist
who caused injury to a plaintiff within the forum state. Similar exceptions
to the territorial limits of the theory were developed on the basis of regu-
latory power to meet the states' needs in the areas of life insurance
policies," and the sale of investment securities. 4 '
B. Fundamental Departure: International Shoe
The fictional devices to which the state resorted in specific substantive
areas in fact did not alter the jurisdictional framework established in
Pennoyer. It was not until the landmark case of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington' that the Supreme Court undertook a major departure from
the jurisdictional foundation based upon physical power over persons and
property within territorial limits. In that case, a Delaware corporation
whose salesmen exhibited samples and solicited orders in the state of Wash-
ington, but maintained no office in that state, was sued in a Washington
state court for failure to pay contributions to the state unemployment
fund.43 In upholding jurisdiction over the corporation, the Court declared:
[Dille process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the terri-
tory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice." 44
This one declaration effectively shifted the underlying rationale of in per-
sonam jurisdiction from physical power to reasonableness—the concern of
substantive due process." The relevant inquiry became the relationship
among the defendant, the forum and the particular litigatibn rather than
the limits of territorial sovereignty." A similarly radical change in the con-
ceptual framework of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction did not occur with the rul-
" 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
"See, e.g., Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S, 93 .
(1917); Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n v. Phelps, 190 U.S. 147, 158 (1903).
41 See, e.g., Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
42 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
" Id. at 311-14.
44 1d. at 316.
" The Court was of the opinion that the proper focus of inquiry was not whether the
corporation was present but rather whether there had been "such contacts of the corporation
with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of gov-
ernment, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there." Id.
at 317 (emphasis added).
" It was the opinion of Judge Learned Hand that under the rule of International Shoe
"the court must balance the conflicting interests involved: i.e., whether the gain to the plaintiff
in retaining the action where it was, outweighed the burden imposed upon the defendant; or
vice versa. That question is certainly indistinguishable from the issue of 'forum non con-
veniens.' " Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 166 F.2d 788, 790.91, (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
337 U.S. 75 (1949). It is submitted in this note, however, that the approach advocated by
Judge Learned Hand has not to date been adopted by the Supreme Court. See note 165 infra.
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ing in International Shoe, despite suggestions ." that its underlying rationale
had been greatly weakened by that decision.
Twelve years later in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co." the Su-
preme Court employed the "minimum contacts" test of fairness and held
that the sale of a single life insurance policy within a state was a sufficient
contact for the state court to assert jurisdiction in a suit by the beneficiary
against the insurer. 49 In this and other decisions 50 the "minimum contacts"
test appeared to have been considerably relaxed. However, a year after
McGee, in 1958, the Court in Hanson v. Denckla" emphasized that "it is es-
sential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purpose-
fully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."52 The con-
troversy in Hanson centered around the competing claims of the residu'ary
legatees of a will and the beneficiaries of an inter vivos trust to part of the
corpus of the trust established in Delaware by a settlor who later became
domiciled in Florida." The settlor had both exercised the power of ap-
pointment under the trust and executed her will in Florida. 54 The Supreme
Court held that the nonresident trustee had not committed acts sufficiently
connected with the state of Florida to justify jurisdiction under International
Shoe." By insisting that minimum contacts analysis demonstrate evidence of
the defendant's purposeful acts within the forum, the Hanson Court effec-
tively reinforced "restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts,"
consistent with International Shoe." Such restrictions were intended to in-
sure that the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant satisfy the concerns
of due process and not merely considerations of convenience. 57
C. The Continued Vitality of Quasi-in-Rem
While the "minimum contacts" test for in personam jurisdiction was
undergoing expansion and reinterpretation by the courts, the quasi-in-rem
rule of Harris-
 v. Balk concerning attachable debts similarly underwent ex-
tended application. This rule, however, also was subjected to criticism.
Criticism of the jurisdictional device came from Judge Traynor of the
California Supreme Court in Atkinson v. Superior Court." There, two groups
47 See, e.g., United States Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142, 154 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977); Hazard, A General Theoty of State-Court Jut -is- diction, 1965 Sup. CT.
REV. 241.
" 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
42 Id. at 221, 223.
" E.g., Perkins v., Benguet Mining Go., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Travelers Health Ass'n v.
Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) (holding that a nonprofit organization's solicitation of new
members through the unpaid efforts of present members satisfied the minimum contacts test).
51 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
52 Id. at 253.
"Id. at 238-39.
54 Id. at 239.
55 Id. at 254. The Court distinguished McGee on the basis that the cause of action was
not "one that arises out of an act done or transaction consummated in the forum State." Id. at
251.
"id. at 251.
57 See id.
"49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), cert. denied, appeal dismissed & cert. denied sub nom.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
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of' California musicians sought a declaration to stop further payments of
royalties and wages by their employers under a trust agreement to a New
York trustee." In the absence of a settled rule as to whether a court could
assert full jurisdiction over conflicting claims to intangibles where it did not
have personal jurisdiction over all the parties, Judge Traynor resolved the
problem by examining the "totality of contacts' with the forum in the
context of fair play and substantial justice," and of the relative interests of
the states concerned. 62 The facts in Atkin,son were so closely analogous to
those in Hanson, decided by the Supreme Court. less than a year later,"
that Justice Douglas in his dissent in Hanson noted the similarity, and ap-
proved of both the California court's interest approach to the jurisdictional
problem as well as its result. 64 .
Notwithstanding Judge Traynor's view that it was irrational to resolve
jurisdictional problems by assigning a fictional situs to intangibles," the
New York Court of Appeals nevertheless found it reasonable to extend the
quasi-in-rem device of •ams to insurance obligations. The case of Seider v.
Roth" concerned a Canadian citizen insured by a New York company,
While in Vermont, the Canadian had an auto accident involving New York
residents. The court upheld the New York residents' assertion of quasi-in-
rem jurisdiction to sue in New York on the basis of their attachment of the
insurer's contractual obligation to defend and indemnify any place where
jurisdiction was obtained over the insured defendant." The court reasoned
that the attachment of the policy obligation was proper since the obligation
was a "debt" owed to the defendant by the insurer who was considered a
resident of New York State." 8
In two subsequent cases, Simpson v. Loehmann 69 and Minichiello v.
Rosenberg,'" both the New York Court of Appeals and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit respectively, affirmed the Seider
procedure on the authority of Harris." However, in both cases, New York's
substantive policy interests in regulating insurers and in providing a forum
for its injured residents were clearly articulated motivations behind the re-
liance upon Harris. In Simpson, the court noted that it was helpful to view
the court's decision in terms of modern considerations of jurisdiction which
,required a "practical appraisal of the situation of the various parties rather
89 49 Cal. 2d at 340-4 I, 316 P.2d at 961-62.
" Id. at 347, 316 P.2d at 965.
" Id. at 345, 316 P.2d at 965.
82 See Traynor, is This Conflict Really Necessary', 37 Tex. L. Rev. 657, 662 (1959).
" In both Atkinson and Hanson, the plaintiff had a strong interest in undertaking the lit-
igation in his particular choice of stales, and the state had a strong interest in asserting juris-
diction since a substantial relationship existed between the state and the subject matter of the
proceedings. Furthermore, the decree would not in either case impinge upon the personal
rights of the nonresident trustee. Unlike Atkinson, however, the trust fund in Hanson was not
in the forum state and fewer of the interested parties resided there. See Developments in the
Law—State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV, L. REV. 909, 960-65 (1960).
" 357 U.S. at 263-64 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
" See Traynor, is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Ttlx. L. RI:v. 657, 662 (1959).
86 17 N.Y.2d III, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
" Id. at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
ex 1d.
21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
" 410 F.2d 106, rehearing en banc, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844
(1969).
7 ' See 21 N.Y.2d at 310, 234 N.E.2d at 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 636; 410 F.2d at 118.
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than an emphasis upon somewhat magical and medieval concepts of pres-
ence and power."" The court observed that the plaintiff's residence in the
state and the insurer's presence in, and regulation by the state, as well as
the insurer's full control of the litigation, were significant factors in the de-
termination of New York's public policy and of the fairness of its assertion
of jurisdiction. 73
 In Minichiello, the Second Circuit affirmed the Seider pro-
cedure with the observation that the Simpson court clearly regarded the
procedure as "in effect a judicially created direct action statute." 74 The
court concluded that in view of what it as well as other commentators" re-
garded as the movement away from the jurisdictional bias favoring the de-
fendant, New York constitutionally could enact a direct action statute in
favor of its residents for out-of-state accidents."
The preceding analysis of the evolution away from the historical limi-
tations on both in personam and in rem jurisdiction suggests the conclusion
that the Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. Balk served as a principal
catalyst in the conceptual developments of state jurisdiction up to the time
of the Shaffer decision. It is submitted that the survival of Harris as au-
thoritative precedent for the extended application of quasi-in-rem jurisdic-
tion helped to generate two divergent judicial approaches to complex juris-
dictional situations created by a society increasingly dependent upon intan-
gible property and interstate transactions.
The first approach was typified by Justice Traynor's opinion in Atkin-
son 77 ' 'roughly a decade after International Shoe. 78 Justice Traynor rejected
the fictional shuts definition of the jurisdictional problem before the court
and instead identified the issue as one of jurisdiction over persons and
property. He found that all the parties had appropriate minimum contacts
with the forum to sustain the court's exercise of jurisdiction." By contrast,
the second approach, embodied in Seider v. Roth, sought to build upon the
authority of Harris and extend its rationale to reach desired policy results.
As seen in Simpson v. Loehmann, 8° although the court suggested consid-
" 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
73 Id. It is important to note that Judge Fuld's language should not be interpreted to
mean that he believed the Spider attachment procedure satisfied the International Shoe standard.
Rather, he set forth some of the considerations which underlay the decision and factors which
would be significant in assessing fairness under the due process clause. His concluding state-
ment was a request For thorough studies of the impact of in rein jurisdiction
on not only litigants in personal injury cases and the insurance industry but also
our citizenry generally .... Absent new data suggesting the desirability of a de-
parture from the general principles underlying in rem jurisdiction, as reflected in
Spider, we find neither basis nor justification for departing from our holding in
that case.
Id. at 312, 234 N.E.2d at 672-73, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 638.
74
 410 F.2d at 109. The court compared the Seider Procedure with the Louisiana Direct
Action Statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22.655 (West) (amended 1962), which had been upheld
by the United States Supreme Cburt in Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., Ltd. 348 •
U.S. 66 (1954). See text at notes 166-76 infra.
7s
	von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV.
L. REv. 1121 (1966).
" 410 F.2d at 110.
" See text at notes 58-64 supra.
"326 U.S. 310 (1945).
" 49 Cal. 2d at 346-48, 316 P.2d at 965.66.
6° See text and note 73 supra.
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erations which would be appropriate were the standard of Fairness applied,
it nevertheless relied upon Harris to apply the fictional Seider device. Simi-
larly the United States Court of Appeals in Minichie//o 81 also chose to rely
upon the authority of Harris,
Thus it may be argued that the two judicial approaches described de-
veloped in large part as a result. of the continued authority of Harris for
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. By the time of the Court's deliberation in Shaffer
v: Heitner, the moment was ripe for the Court to consider whether the
standard of fairness and substantial justice, and not the mechanical re-
quirements of presence and power, henceforth should govern the entire
area of in rem jurisdiction.
II. THE COURT'S REASONING IN SHAFFER v. HEITNER
A. A Departure From Categorical Analysis
Whatever the degree of stability remaining in the Conceptual founda-
tion of in rem jurisdiction, it was evident to the Supreme Court in Shaffer
that. the mere characterization of jurisdictional procedures according to the
traditional categories often could rigidify judicial analysis regardless of the
underlying purposes of such procedures. The Delaware sequestration stat-
ute provided such an example. The principal purpose of the procedure as
stated in the statute" and as interpreted by the Delaware courts,83 was to
compel the personal appearance of the defendant through sequestration,
most often of stock owned by the defendant in a Delaware corporation and
defined statutorily as present in Delaware." Once the defendant entered a
general appearance, the sequestered property normally was released absent
a showing by the plaintiff of a special reason for continuing the sequestra-
tion order." Despite the in personam purpose of the sequestration statute,
the Delaware Supreme Court had found that the quasi-in-rem basis for the
operation of the statute, namely the presence of capital stock in the forum
state, rendered the prior contacts test of International Shoe inapplicable."
In its review of the Delaware court's opinion, the United States Su-
preme Court termed the state court's dismissal of the International Shoe test
"categorical analysis" which assumed the continued conceptual soundness
of Pennoyer v. Neff' as the foundation for in rem jurisdiction." The Court
began its own analysis by departing abruptly from Pennoyer's territorial
premise that a state's authority to adjudicate is based upon its physical
" 410 F.2d at 118.
22 DEL Conk ANN, tit. 10, § 366 (1974). See note 8 supra.
" See Sands v. Lefcourt Realty Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 340, 117 A.2d 365 (1955).
84 DEL Cone. ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (1974).
" See note 8 supra.
"Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 229 (Del. 1976).
21 433 U.S. at 196. The Court noted that in fact that foundation had been seriously
questioned and subsequently weakened by carefully reasoned lower court opinions and the
analysis of a majority of commentators. Id. at 205. In addition, the Court acknowledged that it
also had contributed to the tide of reasoning against Pennoyer by holding in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S 306 (1950), that reasonable and appropriate efforts must
be made to give owners notice before their property can be subjected to a court's judgment.
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 206. The Court stated that in Mullane, it had also held that the require-
ments of the fourteenth amendment do not depend upon whether an action is labeled in rem
or in personam. Id.
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power over either persons or their property." Instead, the Court embraced
the view that judicial jurisdiction over a thing is actually direct jurisdiction
over the interests of persons in a thing." From this premise, the Court rea-
soned that jurisdiction in rem must meet the same due process standard
that would justify the exercise of jurisdiction over the interests of persons
in a thing. That standard was defined in terms of the minimum contacts
test set forth in International Shoe." The Court noted that the validity of its
argument was not affected by the fact that the potential liability of a de-
fendant in an in rem action is limited by the value of the property."'
B. The Test of Fairness Applied to In Rem Rules
Having reasoned that the in rem assertion of jurisdiction . should
satisfy the same standard applied to assertions of in personam jurisdiction,
the Court was careful to emphasize that the single standard of International
Shoe would not deprive state courts of all jurisdiction in rem. Specifically,
two of the three types of in rem jurisdiction identified by the Court"
would not be affected. These two types were pure in rem jurisdiction and
the first category of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction which concerns the interests
of particular persons in property. In both cases, the Court explained, the
"claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying controversy
between the plaintiff and the defendent ...." 93 It would be "unusual" in
such circumstances for the state not to have jurisdiction" since the pres-
ence of property reasonably could he said to bear on the existence of ju-
risdiction by providing contacts among the forum state, the defendant, and
the litigation." 5
 The Court further observed that in such cases, the defen-
dant's claim to property in the forum state usually would imply that he
hoped to benefit from the state's protection of his interest." In addition,
the Court identified certain state policy interests to illustrate other factors
which might support jurisdiction in the types of in rem actions it had iden-
tified." The Court also suggested one further situation where the presence
of property in the state alone might support in rem jurisdiction. Such a sit-
uation, it noted, arose in the case of Dubin v. City of Philadelphia 98 in which
a resident plaintiff brought a tort action against the city for injuries suf-
fered from a fall on a broken sidewalk abutting property owned by a non-
resident." The court upheld the city's joinder under a Pennsylvania statute
" 433 U.S. at 207.
99 Id. The Court endorsed the introductory note of the RESTATEMENT (SECONI)) OF CON-
FLICT or LAWS § 56 (1971) which states: "The phrase, judicial jurisdiction over a thing,' is a
customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing."
" 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 	 •
See 433 U.S. at 207 n.23, 209 n.32. See note 165 infra.
"See note 28 supra.
93 433 U.S. at 207.
"' Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 207.08.
" Id. at 208. Such interests included the state's strong interests in guaranteeing the
marketability of property within its borders, and in providing the means for the peaceful reso-
lution of disputes concerning the possession of that property. The value of witnesses and rec-
ords being located in the same state was also noted. Id. The Court was careful to point out
that the illustrations it provided were not meant to include all factors which might influence
the outcome of a decision or those which would necessarily be determinative. Id. at 208 n.28.
" 34 Pa, D. & C. 61 (1938).
"Id. at 62.	 782
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of the nonresident as a defendant by analogizing to nonresident motor vehi-
cle operator statutes"" which had been held constitutional by the Supreme
Court in Hess v. Paudoski.'" The Shaffer Court noted that while the con-
troversy in Dubin did not involve claims to the property itself, the cause of
action nevertheless "related to rights and duties growing out of that
ownership,"" Thus, within the in rein jurisdictional contacts it defined,
the Court affirmed the proposition that the presence of property alone in
the forum potentially could provide sufficient contacts among the forum,
the defendant and the litigation to satisfy International Shoe'.s . minimum con-
tacts standard. 11). 3
In contrast to this assessment of the impact of the fairness standard
upon the first two categories of in rem actions, the Court concluded that
the new test would significantly affect the quasi-in-rem action typified by
Harris v. Bath and the Delaware sequestration procedure:
These are cases where the property which now serves as the
basis for state court jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the
plaintiffs cause of action. Thus, although the presence of the de-
fendant's property in a State might suggest the existence of other
ties among the defendant, the State, and the litigation, the pres-
ence of the property alone would not, support the State's juris-
diction. If those other ties did not exist, cases over which the
State is now thought to have jurisdiction could not be brought in
that forum.'"
The Court's negative assessment of this particular quasi-in-rem action
flowed not only from the minimum contacts requirement itself but. also
from its view that the underlying rationales for the action were no longer
persuasive. The least persuasive rationale was history itself. Since jurisdic-
tion based solely on the presence of property in the state was in fact the
assertion of jurisdiction over the owner, such a quasi-in-rem procedure
merely perpetuated an ancient form at the expense of modern notions of
clue process."5 A second rationale, namely, that the procedure avoids the
uncertainty inherent in the International Shoe standard and assures the
plaintiff a forum, was equally unpersuasive in the Court's view. In the "vast
majority of cases," it observed, the fairness standard could be easily
applied;' 06 where the standard caused difficulty, the sacrifice of clue pro-
cess for the sake of simplifying the litigation by circumventing the juris-
dictional issue was not acceptable."'
The only rationale to which the Court appeared to make some con-
cession was the traditional argument that the quasi-in-rem device prevented
"" See id. at 63.
"" 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
102 433 U.S. at 208.
"3 See id. at 207-08.
104 1d. at 208-09. The Court noted that Shaffer did not raise, and therefore the Court
did not consider, the question whether, jurisdiction based on property alone is sufficient when
the plaintiff would otherwise lack a forum. Id. at 211 n.37.
105 1d. at 212.
'" Id. at 211.
1 " Id.
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the alleged wrongdoer from removing his assets to another forum to avoid
payment of his obligations.'" While still rejecting the assertion of jurisdic-
tion on the basis of property alone, the Court acknowledged: "At most [the
rationale] suggests that a State in which property is located should have ju-
risdiction to attach that property, by use of proper procedures, as security
for a judgment being sought in a forum where the litigation can be main-
tained consistently with International Shoe."'" In other words, the Court
recognized that where jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying controversy
has been obtained in one forum consistent with International Shoe, a more
limited form of jurisdiction through the attachment of property in another
forum may be permissible where there is the fear that the defendant may
dissipate, conceal or remove assets necessary to satisfy a potential judg-
ment."° Therefore, except for the Court's apparent approval of this lim-
ited form of jurisdiction to order attachment, jurisdiction to adjudicate the
underlying merits of a controversy cannot be based upon the presence of
property alone in the forum where the property is completely unrelated to
the plaintiff's cause of action.
C. The Fairness Test Applied to the Delaware
Sequestration Procedure
Having concluded from its preceding analysis that the mere presence
of a defendant's property in a forum would not support a state court's ju-
risdiction, the Court readily disposed of the jurisdictional argument based
on the Delaware quasi-in-rem statute. The Court reasoned that since the
defendants' corporate stock, defined statutorily as present in Delaware, was
neither the subject matter of the litigation nor related to the underlying
cause of action, it did not provide "sufficient" contacts to support the Del-
aware court's jurisdiction)" Thus, the Court held that the Delaware
sequestration statute was invalid in that it permitted the assertion of state
court jurisdiction solely on the basis of the statutorily defined presence of
defendants' property without proof of other ties among the defendants, the
state and the litigation. 112
The Court devoted the major portion of its analysis to an evaluation
of other ties or "minimum contacts" identified by the plaintiff in its brief
before the Court in support of Delaware's exercise of jurisdiction. These al-
leged contacts were essentially of two types, both relating to the corporation
law of Delaware.
HIM See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 66, Comment a (1971).
'" 433 U.S. at 210.
110
 Indeed, in a recent case in California, Carolina Power & Light Co. v, Uranex, 46
U.S.L.W. 2194 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 1977), the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, held that, consistent with Shaffer, the court could constitutionally exer-
cise jurisdiction to attach, as security for possible judgment in a suit between a North Carolina
plaintiff and a French defendant, a debt owed to the defendant by a California corporation.
The original suit was brought in California. The court stayed the attachment for a specified
amount pending the plaintiff's filing of an action on the merits in which the plaintiff had in
personarn jurisdiction over the defendant.
"' 433 U.S. at 213.
"2 Id. The Court did not question the propriety of Delaware's law, which establishes the
presence of corporate stock by means of a fictional situs.
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First, the plaintiff argued that Delaware had a strong interest in
supervising the management of its chartered corporations by officers and
directors whose obligations were defined by Delaware law." 3 Under that
view the defendants' positions as corporate fiduciaries of a Delaware cor-
poration were sufficient to tie them to the forum's interest in protecting its
regulatory role." 4 Second, the plaintiff asserted that substantial benefits
under Delaware law provide incentives for ?ersons such as defendants to
assume positions in Delaware corporations;'" in view of these "acts" by the
defendants in assuming positions from which they would receive benefits
under Delaware law, fairness required that in return for such benefits, the
defendants respond to Delaware when they are accused of abusing their
powers." 6
The Court rejected the first argument on the ground that Delaware
law as defined in the sequestration statute did not assert the state interest
claimed by the plaintiff."' Jurisdiction was not based upon the defendants'
status as corporate fiduciaries but rather upon the presence of their prop-
erty in the state;"" moreover, the frequent use of the statute's procedure to
reach corporate fiduciaries in derivative actions did not obscure the fact
that it could be used in any suit against a nonresident.'" Finally, the Court
noted that even assuming the importance of Delaware's interest, that inter-
est might determine the appropriate choice of law but not necessarily the
proper jurisdiction.' 20
The Court rejected the second minimum contacts argument, prem-
ised on the defendants' assumption of management positions allegedly to
receive benefits under Delaware law, noting that it was molded from the
same line of reasoning as the first argument.' 2 ' Similar to the first argu-
ment, in the Court's view, the second argument failed to demonstrate any
"purposeful acts" by the delendants1 in the forum such that they could be
said to have availed themselves of the "privilege of conducting activities" 122
in the forum state. Not only did plaintiffs simply have "nothing to do" with
Delaware but also they had no reason on the basis of any "consent" statute
to expect to defend before a Delaware conrt.' 23 The Court,thus concluded
that there were insufficient contacts between the defendants, the state and
the litigation to-support Delaware's assertion of jurisdiction, and consistent
with that. view, it reversed the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court.' 24
Justice Brennan, in a separate opinion, concurred with the reasoning
of the majority in its decision to extend minimum contacts analysis to all as-
"Id. at 213-14.
"' Id.
" 5 Id. at 215. See, e.g., DEL. Coni ANN, tit. 8, §§ 143, 145 (1974) (interest-free loans, in-
demnification).
"6 Id. at 216.
"' Id. at 214.
"" Id. See DEL. CODE ANN. Lit. 10, § 366(a) (1974) at note 8 ,supra.
1 " Id. But see United States Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 192 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 433 U.S. 908 (1977) (use of the sequetration procedure to obtain jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant in a dispute concerning breach of contract disallowed on grounds that
it violated the minimum contacts standard).
125 433 U.S. at 215, quoting Hanson v. Denekla, 357 U.S. at 254.
121 433 U.S. at 216.
122 1d., quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. at 253.
122 433 U.S. at 216.
124 1d. at 217.
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sertions of state court jurisdiction.'" However, he dissented strongly from
the majority's application of the minimum contacts analysis to the factual
record before it and to the majority's conclusion that Delaware lacked suffi-
cient contacts to support its assertion of jurisdiction over the fiduciary de-
fendants. 126 In his view, the majority's application of the fairness test was
premature since the issue of minimum contacts had never been considered
by the lower courts;'" moreover, in his analysis, the Court, despite the lim-
ited record, could have found sufficient contacts to support jurisdiction
based on Delaware's strong substantive interest in regulating the fiduciary
conduct of the officers and directors of its chartered corporations.'"
In sum, the immediate result of the Court's decision to extend
minimum contacts analysis to determinations of in rem jurisdiction is effec-
tively to abrogate a category of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. Jurisdictional pro-
cedures such as were employed in Harris and in the Delaware sequestration
statute must fail since the property upon which jurisdiction is based is
wholly unrelated to the cause of action; the property simply does not give
rise to the necessary contacts among the defendant, the forum and the un-
derlying controversy.
III. AN
 ASSESSMENT OF THE REASONABLENESS OF THE
COURT'S MINIMUM CONTACTS ANALYSIS IN SHAFFER
When assessed within the context of previous decisions, the Court's
application of minimum contacts analysis in Shaffer is consistent. Indeed,
the Court's strict adherence.to the "purposeful act" view in Shaffer not only
is consistent with, but also emphatically reinforces the Court's careful dis-
tinction in Hanson' 29 between choice of law and jurisdictional determina-
tions. It is submitted, however, that within the factual context of Shaffer the
Court's application of the purposeful acts requirement first, is too literal,
and second, as a result of such application, has the unfortunate conse-
quence of unnecessarily separating the choice of law and jurisdiction ques-
tions when no danger of unfairness to the defendants really exists.
As to the first proposition, that the Court applied the purposeful acts
requirement too literally, the Court's emphatic search within the record for
"5
 Id, at 219.
' 26 Id. at 220-22.
12 ' Id. at• 220. Justice Brennan noted that from a practical standpoint, the Court's find-
ing precluded the Delaware courts from exercising the choice of reinterpreting the Delaware
statute in terms of minimum contacts requirements to fulfill the legislature's primary purpose
of securing the personal appearance of out-of-state defendants.
' 29 1d. at 222-28. Justices Powell and Stevens concurred in separate opinions. Id. at
217-19. Both Justices agreed with the majority's extension of the International Shoe standard to
all assertions of jurisdiction and with the finding that the Delaware statute was unconsti-
tutional on its face. However, both registered concern that the majority's opinion not be read
to invalidate the assertion of jurisdiction solely on the basis of real property located within the
forum. Justice Powell in particular argued that in such cases the preservation of quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction would avoid the uncertainty of the fairness standard. Id. at 217. Justice Stevens
emphasized the importance of the due process requirement of fair notice in the context of se-
curities purchases. He noted that Delaware's situs rule and sequestration procedure created
the risk of judgment without notice for every purchaser of securities in the national market.
Id. at 218-19.
129
 See text at note 120 supra.
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evidence that the defendants "set foot" in Delaware or committed "acts" in
Delaware related! to the cause of action, ignored, without explanation, pre-
vious recognition that. out-of-state acts whose effects in the forum state
were foreseeable, may support in personam jurisdiction.' 3" As Justice Bren-
nan observed in his dissent 'in Shaffer, it could be fairly argued that the al-
leged breaches of' trust by nonresident fiduciaries were acts such that the
defendants should have foreseen the damaging effects upon the solvency
and management of the state-chartered corporation.' " ' Although no
explanation is provided, the majority's omission of any reference to this ju-
risdictional approach may be an indirect indication of its disapproval of the
application of expectation analysis to cases such as Shaffer involving allega-
tions of economic injury, rather than liability for personal injury. "Expecta-
tion analysis heretofore has been applied almost exclusively to products lia-
bility cases involving interstate commerce.' 32 Such an approach does go
considerably beyond the purposeful act. view since it looks to the defen-
dant's expectations without regard to the quantum or quality of contacts
necessary to establish jurisdiction relative to a particular type of injury. The
Court's refusal to embrace such an approach in Shaffer, therefore, may be
viewed as consistent with previous applications of expectation analysis and
supportive of lower courts which have rejected such analysis in economic
injury cases. ' " 3
Concerning the defendants' acts within the forum, it is submitted that
Justice Brennan in dissent applied the more appropriate and persuasive
reasoning. That is, the defendants' purposeful acts within the forum were
demonstrable by virtue of their having "voluntarily associated themselves
with the State of Delaware, 'invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws', ... by entering into a long term and fragile relationship with one of
its domestic corporations."'" In doing so, the defendants chose to assume
powers and responsibilities "wholly derived from that State's rules and reg-
ulations, and to become eligible for those benefits that. Delaware law makes
available to its corporations' officials."'"
Justice Brennan's reasoning would seem to suggest the proposition
that a defendant may be held to have invoked the benefits and protections
of the Forum's laws by implication as well as by the literal performance of
acts within the forum. The assertion of state jurisdiction on this basis is
both sensible and fair, since although nonresident directors and officers
might never need physically to enter Delaware, the legitimacy and, to an
extent, the effectiveness of their positions and activities elsewhere depend
upon the benefits 1-incf protections provided by the state. The majority's
view that in the absence of a "consent statute"'" the defendants could not
"" See, e,g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 III. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
433 U.S. at 226 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Comment. Long-Arm and Quasi in
Rem Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test s/ Fairness, 69 MIMI. L. [try, 300, 313, 317 (1970).
"2 See Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951). Con-
tra, Erlanger Mills, inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir, 1956); Johns v. Bay
State Abrasive Prods. Co.. 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950).
"3 See Jack O'Donnell Chevrolet, Inc. v. Shankles, 276 F. Supp. 998, 1004 (N.D. III.
1967) (rejecting expectation analysis in a case involving economic injury).
"4 433 U.S. at 227-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 228.
mold. at 216.
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reasonably have expected to defend before a Delaware court, reflects too
formal a perspective; as justice Brennan observed, the defendants could
surely be "charged!" with the understanding that Delaware would seek to
protect. its substantial interests through its courts—especially in view of the
past application of the sequestration statute for precisely that purpose."'
As a second proposition, it is suggested that in view of the subject
matter of the suit and the nature of the defendants' activities, the Court
would not have violated the standard of fairness had it considered choice
of law as a factor in its determination of jurisdiction. For example, in Atkin-
son and in Hanson, in which the validity of trusts were at issue, it was evident
that the determination of the choice of law question could significantly
shape the results of the litigation; therefore, the treatment of choice of law
as merely a factor favoring or disfavoring jurisdiction conceivably could
have violated the standard of fair play for the parties in such circum-
stances. In a factual context such as presented in Hanson, therefore, the
Court's refusal to consider choice of law as a factor in jurisdiction and its
insistence upon evidence of the defendant's purposeful acts within the
forum may have produced a fair result, however questionable it might
seem by comparison to the interest approach taken in the analogous case of
Atkinson.' 38 Under the facts of Shaffer, unlike the factual circumstances pre-
sented in Atkinson and Hanson, the possible alternative forum(s) would not
likely have had a strong interest in the outcome of such litigation based
upon claims of fiduciary mismanagement of a Delaware corporation. In-
deed, in the past, despite the operation of the Delaware sequestration stat-
ute which threatened jurisdictional conflicts by defining the situs of all cor-
porate stock within Delaware, states nevertheless deferred to Delaware law
or held that Delaware's situs rule controlled.'" Furthermore, Delaware law
would most likely govern the litigation, since under general principles of
conflicts of law the local law of the state of incorporation normally applies
to determine the existence and extent of corporate officers' liability to the
corporation and shareholders.""
The starting point for a more liberal and arguably more reasonable
jurisdictional analysis of the factual circumstances presented in Shaffer is
the state interest in regulating its chartered corporations—the factor which
the Court confined to choice of law considerations. The Court acknowl-
edged that, in general, the law of the state of incorporation is held to gov-
ern the liabilities of officers and directors to the corporation and its stock-
holders.' 4 ' However, the Court rejected the notion that the general rule is
137 Id. at 227 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan further noted: "Even in the
absence of such a statute ... the close and special association between a state corporation and
its managers should apprise the latter that the state may seek to offer a convenient forum for
addressing claims of fiduciary breach of trust." Id.
1 " See Developments in the Lazo–State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 965 (1960).
13 " See Mills v. facobs,.333 Pa. 231, 4 A.2d 152 (1939). See also Folk & Moyer, Sequestra-
tion in Delaware: A Constitutional Analysis, 73 Cows'. L. REV. 749 (1973).
13 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or CONFLICT OF LAWS § 309 (1971). See also 433 U.S. at
225 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966). The authors suggest what arguably is the
more reasonable and practical approach: "Rules respecting the assumption of jurisdiction must
take the choice-of-law problem into account when choice is impossible either inherently or as a
matter of practice—when the forum, if it adjudicates, will automatically regulate the con-
troversy under its own domestic-law rule." Id. at 1129 (emphasis in original).
" 433 U.S. at 215 n.44.
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based upon the interest of the state of incorporation rather than upon the
need for uniform standards to govern the internal affairs of a corpora-
tion.'" Thus, as Justice Brennan implied in his dissent, the Court, more by
assertion than explanation, appeared , to distinguish a state's incorporation
law from other areas of law where the states have been held to have a regu-
latory interest, or a strong interest in monitoring the affairs of an entity
whose creation is by virtue of state law.'" In fact, the Court went further
and suggested that even if Delaware had enacted a statute clearly designed
to protect the alleged state interest, that interest, in the absence of defen-
dants' purposeful acts, would only support the application of Delaware law
to the controversy but not its power to enforce its law with respect to the
parties.' A 4
It is submitted, however, that fair play and substantial justice describe
the outer limits of constitutional due process and arguably must be deter-
mined in the context of each jurisdictional purpose. 145 In Shaffer, Dela-
ware's jurisdictional purpose was to assert judicial control over a derivative
action which raised "allegations of abuses of the basic. management of an
institution whose existence [was] created by the State and whose powers
and duties [were] defined by state la'w ."'" Given the context of Dela-
ware's jurisdictional purpose, therefore, as well as the state's acknowledged
competence in interpreting its corporation law' 47 and the high concentra-
tion nationally of corporations in Delaware, choice of' law could validly have
been considered by the Court as a factor favoring jurisdiction, without risk
of unfairness to the defendant.'" The Court's literal application of the
'" Id. see Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1947).
143 433 U.S. at 223-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting), citing McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (insurance regulation); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S.
643 (1950) (blue sky laws); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Justice
Brennan found the Court's position even more incongruous in view of its recent decision in
Santa Fe Indus,, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), in which it reaffirmed the paramount
interests of the domestic forum in the conduct of its fiduciaries:
As the Court stated in Con v. Ash .... 'Corporations are creatures of state law,
and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding
that, except where federal law expressly:requires certain responsibilities of direc-
tors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the
corporation.' 422 U.S. at 84."
430 U.S. at 479 (emphasis in original).
' 44 433 U.S. at 214-15.
1 " See Leflar, The Converging Limits of State Jurisdictional Powers, 9 J. Puts. L. 282, 292
(1960).
Hu 433 U.S. at 224 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
I" Folk & Moyer, Sequestration in Delautare: A Constitutional Analysis, 73 COLIJM. L. REV.
749, 795 (1973).
' 4 " Under the present circumstances, the matter rests with the Delaware legislature to
replace its constitutionally defective sequestration device with some litigation-centering proce-
dure to enable Delaware to continue to enforce its corporation law in protection of its substan-
tive interests. The most effective solution may be for the legislature to enact a special long-arm
statute applying to nonresident officers, directors, and majority shareholders. ThiS course of
action has been suggested previously by students of Delaware corporation law, See Folk &
Moyer, Sequestration in Delaware: A Constitutional Analysis, 73 CoLum. L. REV. 749, 798 (1973).
The authors suggest that such a statute would clearly be constitutional since suits involving the
activities of nonresident. fiduciaries of domestiC corporations are of substantial concern and re-
lation to the forum, The Court's reasoning in Shaffer casts some doubt upon the certainty of
such a conclusion since it characterizes the assertion of state interest by statute or otherwise as
a choice of law question. See text at notes 111-28 supra, Nevertheless the Court's favotrable
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purposeful acts requirement and its restriction of Delaware's regulatory
interest to a choice of law question provide evidence that the Court has not
yet adopted the broader conflicting interests approach taken in Atkitison' 43
and urged in various forms by commentators. 15 "
IV. A REAPPRAISAL OF THE
	
PROCEDURE UNDER THE CouRrs
APPROACH TO THE STANDARD OF FAIRNESS IN SHAFFER
In conjunction with its conclusion that all assertions of state court ju-
risdiction must henceforth satisfy the standard of International Shoe and its
progeny,i 5 ' the Shaffer Court made the following observation: "It would
not be fruitful for us to re-examine the facts of cases decided on the ra-
tionales of Pennoyer and Harris to determine whether jurisdiction might
have been sustained under the standard we adopt today. To the extent that
prior decisions are inconsistent with this standard, they are overruled."'"
The statement suggests two conclusions. First, the Court's opinion should
be read as a rejection of the territorial theory of jurisdiction set forth in
Pennoyer and expanded by means of a "fictional situs" in Harris. Second, the
Court's rejection of Harris as fundamentally unfair should not be under-
stood to overrule all quasi-in-rem cases which relied upon Harris for au-
thority. Instead, such cases should be re-examined under the standard of
fairness and rejected only where "inconsistent" with that standard.
A logical focus for such a re-examination is the Seider attachment pro-
cedure admittedly fashioned on the Harris rationale' 53 and recently upheld
by a lower court following the Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer. 154 In
view of the Shaffer Court's specific scrutiny of Harris under the fairness
standard and its analogy of the Delaware sequestration procedure to Harris,
it is important to assess whatever bearing the reasoning in Shaffer, specifi-
cally its approach under the standard of fairness, might have upon an
evaluation of the fairness of the Seider procedure.
It will be recalled that under the original physical power rationale of
in rem actions, the judicial inquiry centered upon the presence of property
within the forum. Under minimum contacts analysis, it was the Court's view
that the presence of property remains relevant to the new inquiry since it
reference at the same time to existing statutes which seek to achieve Delaware's purpose, albeit
by the earlier fictional device of consent, suggests that a specially designed statute which spe-
cifically defines the contacts of such management controversies with the forum might be up-
held.
"'See text at notes 58-64 supra.
"° See von Mehren & Trautman,furisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV.
L. REV. 1121 (1966). See note 165 infra.
151 433 U.S. at '212.
' 52 Id. at 212 n.39.
'" See text and notes 66-76 supra. For a view distinguishing the rationale of Harris from
the Seider procedure, see Judge Anderson's dissent in Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106,
rehearing en bane, 410 F.2d 117, 120-22 (2d Cir. 1968) (Anderson, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 844 (1969).
'See O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) appeal dock-
eted, No. 78-7050 (2d Cir. Oct. 25, 1977); see discussion of case at note 176 infra. For other
jurisdictions which have applied the Seider procedure, see Adkins v. Northfield Foundry and
Mach. Co., 393 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Minn. 1974); Savchuk v. Rush, — Minn. —, 245
NAV.2c1 624 (1976), vacated, 433 U.S. 902 (1977); Forbes v. Boynton, 113 N.H. 617, 313 A.2d
129 (1973). But see Robitaille v. Orciuch, 382 F. Supp. 977 (D.N.H. 1974); Camire v. Scieszka,
116 N.H. 281, 358 A.2d 397 (1976).
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may "bear on the existence of jurisdiction by providing contacts among the
forum State, the defendant, and the litigation."'" By the examples'''` it
provided, the Shaffir Court sought. to demonstrate that the presence of the
defendant's property alone could sufficiently connect the defendant with
the forum provided a relationship between the property and the cause of
action could be shown: either the property was the subject matter of the lit-
igation or somehow related to the cause of action. At this point in the
Court's analysis it might be argued that in Sealer and its progeny, the cause
of action and the defendant's property (insurer's obligation) attached were
related and thus provided sufficient. contacts between the defendant and
the forum for the exercise of jurisdiction. To be sure, when compared to
the property attached in Harris (debt of defendant's debtor) or in Shaffer
(defendants' stock holdings), the insurer's obligation to defend and indem-
nify the defendant in a suit. resulting from an automobile accident is cer-
tainly "related" to the cause of action. However, for the following reasons,
it is submitted that the assertion of jurisdiction on the basis of that observa-
tion alone would impose too casual a reading on the Court's reasoning in
Shaffer.
The Shaffer Court's concern was with the sufficiency of the defendant's
contacts with the forum such that it might reasonably be inferred that the
defendant expected to enjoy the benefits and protections of the forum's
laws, and thus also reasonably expected to have to defend in the forum.
Throughout its analysis in Shaffer, the Court stressed that the inference of
the defendant's expectation must be supported by minimum contacts
analysis which demonstrates the defendant's "purposeful acts" within the
foru mil—the view originally articulated by the Court in Hanson.'"
Moreover, as stated in Hanson and applied by the Court in Shaffer, the
minimum contacts requirement with its emphasis upon purposeful acts,
functions in the nature of a condition precedent. 158 Thus, in the in rem
examples provided by the Court in Shaffer, the defendant's claim to
ownership of property in the forum was the prerequisite act sufficient to
support the inference that he expected to benefit from the,state's protec-
tion of his interest against claims either to the property itself or somehow
related to the rights and duties growing out of' the defendant's ownership
of the property.':, "
By contrast to the Court's in rem examples, in both' Harris and Shaffer,
under the reasoning of the majority in Shaffer, the defendants could not be
said to have purposefully acted in the forums involved and thereby to have
expected to benefit from the state's protection of their property interests.'"
153
 433 U.S. at 207.
156 Id. at 207-08. See text at notes 92-102 supra.
1 " 357 U.S. at 253.
IM The Court in Hanson stated: "However minimal the burden of defending in a
foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the 'minimal
contacts' with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him. See Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 . ..." Id. at 251. (emphasis added).
"° See text at notes 92-102 supra.
"° The Court does not actually state this proposition about the defendant's expectation
in connection with its conclusion concerning Harris. However, in view of' the fact that the
Court does assert the proposition in relation to its discussion of in rem actions, 433 U.S. at
207-08, (see text at note 96 supra), and in its analysis of other possible contacts of defendants
in Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 216, this inference would seem reasonable.
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In Harris, the defendant's debtor was subject to garnishment wherever he
might travel; in Shaffer, the defendants' holdings were assigned a "fictional
sites" under Delaware law. 16 ' Furthermore in Shaffer, it is significant that
once the Court found the defendants' holdings in Greyhound insufficient
as a basis to support jurisdiction, it consistently limited the focus of the re-
mainder of its inquiry to possible contacts between the defendants and the
forum, and did not extend its analysis to the "interests" of the state or of
the plaintiff. Thus, it noted that no evidence existed that the defendants
actually had ever set foot in Delaware or committed any acts in Delaware
related to the cause of action.' 62
 It was not persuaded by the plaintiff's as-
sertion that Delaware's strong interest in regulating the management of its
corporations provided sufficient "contacts, ties, or relations"'" between the
defendants' corporate positions and the forum.'"
In light of this reasoning by the Court in Shaffer, it is difficult to imag-
ine the Court upholding jurisdiction in a Seider-type case where the defen-
dant is a nonresident involved in an accident outside the plaintiff's state,
but whose insurance company simply happens to do business in the plain-
tiff's state. Like the defendants in Shaffer, the nonresident defendant in
such a Seider situation could not be said to have ever set foot in the plain-
tiff's state or to have committed any acts in that state related to the cause of
action. The mere presence of the defendant's insurance company and its
obligation in the forum state—and in many other states most likely—could
not be regarded as the type of purposeful act by the defendant con-
templated in Hanson and upon which the Shaffer Court insisted.' 65
161
 See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (1974).
1 " 433 U.S. at 213.
"aid. at 213-14, quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319.
1 " The Court noted that Delaware's interest, however strong, did not demonstrate that
the state was necessarily a "fair forum" for the litigation: "[The State] does not acquire ... ju-
risdiction by being the 'center of gravity' of the controversy, or the most convenient location
for litigation. The issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of law. It is resolved in this case by
considering the acts of the [appellants]." Id. at 215 (emphasis added), quoting Hanson v. Denck-
Ia, 357 U.S. at 254. •
• 165 Id. It might be argued that the Court indirectly , approved of Seider through the
pointed reference in its opinion immediately following its conclusion that not every in rem ac-
tion would be affected by the adoption of the International Shoe standard for all assertions of
state court jurisdiction to the recent law review article by Columbia University Professor Hans
Smit, See Smit, The Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Penner v. Neff, 43
BROOKLYN L. Rev. 600 (1977). As part of his overall analysis of in rem actions, Professor Smit
approves the Seider attachment procedure as meeting the test of reasonableness. Id. at 624,
628 n.114.
It is not the purpose of this note to examine the Professor's article in detail within the
context of Shaffer, However, in view of both the Supreme Court's reference to it and the fact
that in the recent case of O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y.
1977) appeal docketed, No. 78-7050 (2d Cir. Oct. 25, 1977), it was cited by the plaintiff as evi-
dence of the Court's approval of Seider, it is important to 'make the following brief comments.
First, unlike the Court in Shaffer, Professor Smit applies a balancing of interests approach to in
rem actions under the fairness standard. 43 BROOKLYN L. REA'. at 608. It is a "limited interest
analysis" confined to the balancing of the interests of the defendant, the plaintiff, and the
state, with primary weight given to the interest of the defendant in not being sued away from
his home. However, the defendant's interest will be depreciated when the defendant has acted
or has property within the forum. Professor Smit concludes that the quasi-in-rem jurisdiction
exercised in Seider is reasonable where the obligation is owed by a debtor who is either a resi-
dent of, or permanently established in, the forum and the plaintiff's interest or that of the
forum state or both, favor the forum. Id. at 624. In contrast to Professor Smit's interest for-
mula, the Shaffer Court's analysis ignores the plaintiff's interest, defines the state's interest as a
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The preceding conclusion that a Seider-type assertion of jurisdiction
cannot survive in light of Shaffer would appear necessary at least as long as
the fiction is maintained that the insured is the real party at interest.'" It is
that fiction which the Seider procedure unmasks. From this note's earlier
historical analysis"' of the series of decisions which sustained the consti-
tutionality of' the Seider procedure, it seems evident that the principal moti-
vation behind the judicial procedure is to facilitate the convenience of the
New York plaintiff and to provide a direct remedy against the tortfeasor's
insurer in cases where the plaintiff Otherwise would have to pursue a non-
resident tortfeasor in a foreign jurisdiction for an injury which occurred
outside New York St.ate." 8 This particular objective, premised only upon
the plaintiff's domicile and the insurer's place of business, is not presently
feasible under existing direct action statutes such as the one"'`' approved by
the Supreme Court in Watson v. Employers. Liability Assurance Corp. Ltd.""
The Court in Watson stressed the occurrence of the accident within the state
as the event which gave rise to the state's legitimate interest in applying its
direct action statute to protect its medical creditors and to prevent the ex-
penditure of 'public funds to aid persons injured in the state."' Judged
within the context of Shaffer, it is not certain that New York could consti-
tutionally authorize a local action against the insurer for the purpose of
facilitating the New York plaintiff in an out-of-state accident: The Court's
underlying concern in its minimum, contacts analysis in Shaffer was that a
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation be demon-
strated, sufficient to justify the state's assertion of personal jurisdiction over
the defendants.'" The Court's emphasis upon the defendants' purposeful
acts within the forum was intended to assure that relationship. The
defendant-insurer's doing business :in the plaintiff's state is admittedly a
purposeful act which invokes the benefits and protections of the state's
laws. However, where neither-the injury occurs within the plaintiff's state
nor the insurance contract is written or delivered therein,'" there remains
choice of law question, and focuses exclusively upon the defendant's purposeful acts within
the forum. Second, Professor Smit premiseS the reasonableness and therefore the consti-
tutionality of the Seider attachment in large part upon the limited liability of' the defendant. Id.
at 621, 628 n.114. However, the Court in Shaffrr specifically rejected' that limitation as a jus-
tification for the assertion, of jurisdiction. Set; text at note 91 supra.. Thus, whatever the per-
suasiveness of Professor Sillies interest approach to the Seider procedure under the standard
of fairness, it is suggested that it does not coincide with the Court's approach in Shaffer. At
most it would appear that the Court's citation was intended to refer the reader to a more de-
tailed thOugh differing analysis of its condusiOn that many in rein actions in which property is
related to the cause of action would not be affected by the International Shoe test.
18" The law creates this fiction in order. to protect the insurer against unduly sympathet-
ic juries. See Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d at 314, 234 N.E.2d at 673-74, 287 N.Y.S.2d at
639 (Keating, J., concurring).
187 See text at notes 66-76 supra.
" 8
 New York presently provides for an "indirect" remedy against the insurer through
its long-arm statute which permits the resident plaintiff to bring a local suit against the in-
sured tortfeasor for injuries which occurred 'within the state. See N.Y. Qv. PRAC. LAW § 302
(McKinney 1972).
188 See note 74 supra.
170
 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
171 Id. at 72-73.
'2 433 U.S. at 204, 207, 216.
	 '
"3
 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); see text and note 55
supra.
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the question whether a sufficient relationship exists between the defendant,
the forum and the litigation to satisfy the standard of fairness and to sub-
ject the insurer as the defendant to personal jurisdiction. 14
A constitutionally sufficient relationship might be founded on the
recognition that the domicile state also has a financial interest similar to the
accident state's in Watson of providing a forum for the convenience of its
citizens in cases where they might otherwise be forced to resort to the
state's welfare resources. However, in Shaffer the Court resisted such an
expansive assertion of jurisdiction based on the state's alleged substantive
interests; it relegated such considerations to choice of law questions. 175
Whether the Shaffer Court would distinguish between state regulatory
interests which implicate its welfare resources and those which concern the
management of its domestic corporations in assessing the constitutionality
of a direct action statute for residents injured in out-of-state accidents, is
unclear.' 76
! 7 ' See Rosenberg, One Procedural Genie Too Many or Putting Seider Back Into Its Bottle, 71
COLUM L. REV. 660 (1971). The author in this pre-Shaffer article proposed a direct action stat-
ute to achieve the underlying purpose of the Seider procedure. Relying on judge Friendly's
reasoning in Minichiello, see text at notes 74-76 supra, the author suggested that the consti-
tutionality of such a statute probably would be upheld where the nonresident tortfeasor's in-
surer had qualified to do business or was doing business in the state. Id. at 668, Under the
proposed statute, the new right of direct action would be limited to persons domiciled in New
York State and to cases where personal jurisdiction over the insured was not possible. In view
of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Shaffer, it is uncertain whether the proposed statute
would be constitutional.
15
 433 U.S. at 215-16.
1" It is noteworthy that following the Shaffer Court's mandate to reassess in rem actions
in terms of fairness, the recent case of O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994
(E.D.N.Y. 1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-7050 (2d Cir. Oct. 25, 1977) upheld the Seider device.
The plaintiff-decedent, a resident of New York, was killed through the alleged negligent op-
eration of a grader owned and operated by a Virginia corporate defendant, at a construction
site in Virginia. The plaintiff obtained a Seider-based attachment of the contractual obligations
of the defendant's insurance companies which maintain offices in New York. On the facts be-
fore it, the district court admitted that it could not be argued that the defendant or its
employee had "even a minimum of contacts with New York, . . or that, if, instead of contract
rights against two insurers, tangible property transiently in New York were the property at-
tached, it would be easy to claim that jurisdiction could exist in a New York court." Id. at 997.
Nevertheless, the court reasoned that, consistent with the Shaffer Court's insistence upon
the "purposeful acts" requirement, when allegedly tortious conduct causes death, a "legal rela-
tionship" is created between the alleged tortfeasor and the decedent's dependents. Id. Most
importantly, however, the court distinguished Shaffer and International Shoe from the case before
it on the ground that the latter did not involve the assertion of unlimited personal jurisdiction;
rather, jurisdiction was based upon the insurer's obligation to defend, with recovery limited to
the face value of the policy. It was "beside the point to test the constitutionality of the proce-
dure in terms of the named defendant" since for the insured, the suit was "only an occasion of
cooperation in the defense ," Id. at 1002. Moreover, "an analysis of jurisdictional propriety
in the ultimate terms implied by Shaffer [could] not ignore the claimants' circumstances and
her interest in litigating in the forum of her residence." Id. at 997. However desirable the re-
sults in O'Connor, it is submitted4that the court seized upon the Supreme Court's mandate to
reassess in rein actions under International Shoe and fashioned results that are not supported
by the Court's reasoning in Shaffer. in effect, the district court adopted the 'interest analysis'
suggested in Simpson v. Loehmann, see text at notes 72-73 supra, to determine the fairness of
asserting jurisdiction. Significantly, a number of New York lower courts have subsequently
held that Shaffer overruled Seider. See Katz v. Umansky, 92 Misc. 2d 285 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Wal-
lace v. The Target Store Inc., 92 Misc. 2d 454 (Sup. Ct. 1977). But see Alford v. McGaw, 402
N.Y.S, 2d 499 (App. Div. 1978).
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It is reasonable to conclude, however, that. the Seider procedure can
no longer stand upon the quasi-in-rem rationale of Harris, so clearly re-
pudiated by the Court in Shaffer. Moreover, as long as the procedure func-
tions as a judicially created direct action statute in which the nonresident
tortleasor still remains the real party at interest, it is of doubtful consti-
tutional validity under the fairness standard adopted in Shaffer.
CONCLUSION
By rejecting the territorial theory underlying in rem jurisdiction and
extending the principles of International Shoe to cover all assertions of state
court jurisdiction, the Court in Shaffer provided a more sensible standard
for the resolution of jurisdictional questions in a modern society in which
disputes arise from complex interstate transactions involving both persons
and property. However, in concluding upon the facts before it that the Del-
aware courts could not validly assert jurisdiction over nonresident corpo-
rate fiduciaries in a stockholder's derivative suit involving a Delaware cor-
poration, the Court applied the minimum contacts test too restrictively.
The Court's focus upon the absence of the defendants' literal "acts" within
the forum ignored the defendants' implicit contacts with the forum as
corporate officers and directors of a domestic corporation. Moreover, from
a practical viewpoint, the fact that the controversy centered upon the mis-
management of a Delaware corporation virtually eliminated the choice of
law question under the general rule of conflicts governing corporate officer
liability. The Court's relegation of the state's regulatory interest. to a choice
of law consideration unnecessarily separated the jurisdictional and choice of
law issues when no danger of unfairness to the defendants actually existed.
The eventual impact of the Court's decision upon other jurisdictional
issues previously decided upon the in rem rationales of Pennoyer and Harris
remains to be determined upon a case by case basis. With respect to the
Seider jurisdictional procedure devised upon the now repudiated quasi-in-
rem rationale of Harris, it would appear unlikely that the procedure can
survive under the standard of fairness as applied by the Shaffer Court. Shaf-
fer reveals that the Court, in its approach to questions of jurisdiction under
the fairness standard, has not yet adopted interest analysis as urged by
sonic commentators and as employed most recently by proponents of the
continued validity of the Seider jurisdictional procedure.
BRIAN W. BLAESSER
THE ROLE OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN PROVING
DISCRIMINATORY INTENT: DEVELOPMENTS SINCE
WASHINGTON V. DAVIS
In its landmark decision in Washington v. Davis,' the Supreme Court
held that proof of both an invidious discriminatory purpose and a racially
disproportionate impact in necessary to establish that a law or other official
' 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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